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Abstract:
This article explains the changing relationship between Irish lead-
ers, the Irish-American diaspora, Irish-American political elites, 
and American diplomacy. Specifically, we explore the transnational 
advocacy networks (TANSs) associated with the Irish diaspora and 
their impact on American diplomacy. In the early twentieth centu-
ry, de Valera failed to mobilize Irish-America to convince President 
Wilson to recognize the Irish Republic. By the late twentieth cen-
tury Irish-Americans became effective foreign policy entrepreneurs 
in Congress re-orienting US diplomacy toward Northern Ireland. 
Irish political elites utilized both the diaspora and their elite con-
nections to transform the American policy of deference to its Cold 
War ally to an engaged diplomacy mediating and promoting peace. 
Keywords: Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs, Four Horse-
men, Irish-American Diaspora, Northern Aid Committee (NO-
RAID), Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) 
There is a long history of Irish governmental efforts to mobilize the 
Irish-American diaspora to influence United States foreign policy. The first 
President of the Irish Republic travelled throughout the United States (US) 
seeking to mobilize this diaspora to convince President Wilson to grant dip-
lomatic recognition to the Irish Republic in 1919. Though the mission failed, 
it symbolized the Irish understanding that the diaspora in America could 
be used to pressure the US government and thereby shape American foreign 
policy to its interests. The Irish thus have differentiated the diaspora in the 
US from the Irish diaspora in other states based on the emerging power of 
the US in the twentieth century. The belief that the Irish-American diaspora 
could be utilized to modify American policy on behalf of the Irish cause was 
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highlighted in more recent years by John Hume’s efforts to elicit the support 
of prominent Irish-Americans and the Irish diaspora in America in support 
of the Northern Ireland peace process. While analysis of the Irish-American 
diaspora has most frequently focused on the role of nationalist and republican 
politicians, Unionists in Northern Ireland have recognized and attempted to 
mobilize the large Scots-Irish diaspora in the US for their political agenda 
as well. Increasingly, scholars have identified diasporas as important actors 
in world politics, and our research seeks to link the transnational advoca-
cy networks (TANs) associated with the Irish diaspora in the United States 
with the formal diplomacy between the governments of Ireland, the United 
Kingdom (UK), and the United States during the Northern Ireland peace 
process. As such, this article does not focus on the historical development of 
the Irish diaspora in America or systematically compare the Irish diaspora 
in the US with the Irish diaspora in other states. While the Irish diaspora 
is truly global, the Irish in Britain, Australia, Canada, Latin America and 
other countries did not exert much influence on the Northern Ireland peace 
process. Thus, we focus on the Irish diaspora in the US’ influence and ability 
to facilitate an emerging peace process in Northern Ireland. Foreign policy 
entrepreneurs in the US Congress were the critical intermediaries between 
Irish nationalist politicians and the Irish diaspora in America that ultimate-
ly brought about the change in US policy from one of deference to British 
policy in Northern Ireland to one of diplomatic engagement, often on behalf 
of the Irish nationalist/republican cause. This article highlights the complex 
pattern of cooperation that developed between government representatives 
and the diaspora in formulating, developing, and changing American foreign 
policy toward Northern Ireland and how this impacted on the peace process.
1. International Relations Theory, Diasporas, Diplomacy, and the Northern 
Ireland Peace
Liberal theorists of international relations recognize that individuals can 
have influence based on their charisma and their ability to promote their inter-
est. In peace processes, despite the importance of structural conditions (Ruane 
and Todd 2014), leaders are important when they take advantage of opportu-
nities to achieve peace. Ripsman (2016) has identified two stages in peace pro-
cesses. First, peacemakers from above, leaders of states, negotiate an agreement 
and then groups in civil society build peace from below. In Northern Ireland, 
Alderdice (2014) and Dixon (2017) believe political elites were critical in lead-
ing the peace process. McLoughlin (2017a) has highlighted the important role 
John Hume played as the leading nationalist politician in Northern Ireland in 
convincing American leaders of his vision for peace. Hume was able to both 
articulate a clear vision for peace based on power-sharing and North-South co-
operation in Ireland and act as an effective political agent to achieve this plan 
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for peace. David Trimble, as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), took 
risks for peace by negotiating with and ultimately sharing power with nation-
alists and even republicans (McDonald 2000; Godson 2004; Millar 2004). 
He understood that power-sharing was necessary in order to gain the decom-
missioning of republicans. The peace he advocated allowed Northern Ireland 
to remain in the United Kingdom, the ultimate goal for unionists. After the 
electoral demise of Trimble and the UUP, Ian Paisley and subsequent leaders 
of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreed to share power with Sinn Féin 
in the aftermath of the St. Andrews Agreement. Bertie Ahern and negotiators 
for the Irish government proved effective in providing a viable mechanism for 
North-South cooperation while rescinding territorial claims to Northern Ire-
land and helping to promote the implementation of the Good Friday Agree-
ment (McDermott 2014). Simultaneously, Tony Blair and negotiators for the 
British government like Jonathan Powell were adept at keeping the negotia-
tions and peace process going even if it meant fudging the truth (Aughey 2002; 
Gormley-Heenan 2007; Dixon 2014 and 2019). Finally, republican leaders in 
Northern Ireland, especially Gerry Adams and Martin McGuinness, demon-
strated a willingness to negotiate and ultimately promoted ceasefires, various 
peace agreements, and disarmament that were critical to the peace process 
(Hazleton 2000; Stevenson 2011). In sum, effective and talented leaders from 
multiple political parties and in a number of states contributed to the achieve-
ment of peace in Northern Ireland. 
Peace, however, is not made by elites alone. Putnam (1988) conceived of 
diplomacy as a two-level game where governments negotiate with each other 
and their own constituencies. Liberal international relations theorists have 
stressed not only the role of elites but the role domestic groups play in the 
formulation of a state’s foreign policy. Applying selectorate theory developed 
by Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003), Owsiak (2017) 
has demonstrated the important role that domestic constituencies played in 
the Northern Ireland peace process. Diasporas are a specific kind of domestic 
group that seek to influence a government’s foreign policy, especially toward 
their historic homeland (Shain and Barth 2003; Shain 2007). Diasporas can 
be a source of conflict (Shain 2002; Adamson 2013) or a source of conflict 
resolution (Shain 2002; Shain and Aryasinha 2006; Bercovitch 2007; Baser 
and Swain 2008) depending on how the diaspora views the conditions in its 
ancestral homeland and the proper role of its new government. A state’s effort 
to utilize a diaspora to assist it in influencing another state is quite similar 
to historic efforts to use propaganda to achieve influence. However, instead 
of attempting to reach a large percentage of the other state’s population, ef-
forts to utilize a diaspora recognize the important link that those who live 
in a diaspora have to their ethnic homeland. This can motivate some in the 
diaspora to influence the government of their new state on issues of special 
interest to those in the land of their ancestors.
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While diasporas can be resources that states seek to mobilize to influence 
other states, they are also autonomous groups that play an important role in 
shaping the politics of their adopted homeland. Members of a diaspora may 
identify with the land of their ancestors, but this does not mean that a dias-
pora does whatever the historic state or government wishes. The autonomy 
gained by living in another state frees members of a diaspora from an obliga-
tion to the do the bidding of the state of their birth or ancestry. Nevertheless, 
many in a diaspora continue to feel an important connection to the land, terri-
tory, and people of their home state. As a result, many scholars have suggested 
that diasporas play an especially important role in defining and redefining the 
identity of their home nation (Anderson 1998; Anthias 1998; Ma Mung 2004; 
Tölölyan 2007; Hickman 2012). Their experience abroad informs the politics 
of their homeland as emigrant experiences challenge traditional norms and 
place pressure on the governments of their homeland to offer more economic 
opportunity and political security to prevent the need for emigration in the 
future. Inevitably, emigration is a sign of failure in the traditional conception 
of a state which included a population within a given territory. The fact that 
the physical boundary of the state fails to provide the opportunity or security 
that its citizens seek inevitably places pressure on states to change policies to ac-
cede to the needs of its citizens. Akenson (1996, 10) notes that in the twentieth 
century emigration has been a sign of failure for numerous Irish governments. 
While scholars historically conceived of groups as domestic or internal 
actors, the increased linkages that exist across states means that scholars no 
longer conceive of groups as isolated and parochial but as groups who share 
interests, information and even identities across state borders. This has meant 
that diasporas can increasingly interact with those living in their home state. 
Gupta (2017) has applied the concept of Transnational Advocacy Networks 
(TANs) to explain the numerous licit, semi-licit, and illicit relationships 
that existed connecting organizations in the US to nationalist and republi-
can groups in Ireland during the Troubles and the peace process. These net-
works linked individuals in the US and Ireland through a common interest 
in Ireland and Irish freedom. A wide array of organizations existed, some 
autonomously and independently created by individuals in the US but some 
were sponsored or linked to political groups in Ireland. Networks connect-
ing the Irish diaspora and Irish politicians and interests date back to the late 
nineteenth century (Keown 2016), but Irish-America and ultimately the US 
government became motivated to engage and attempt to influence North-
ern Ireland during the Troubles, especially in the aftermath of the British 
policy of internment. American groups and prominent Irish-Americans in 
Congress, especially Senator Ted Kennedy, pressured the Nixon administra-
tion to protest British policy as the Troubles intensified (MacLeod 2016, 27).
As Keck and Sikkink (1998) contend, TANs are likely to develop in 
states that seek to raise their international standing by a successful interven-
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tion. Groups formed autonomously in the US and those that were linked to 
parties or individuals in Ireland recognized that American engagement in 
Northern Ireland would be diplomatic and would not be based on the threat 
of or use of military force. US diplomatic engagement in Northern Ireland 
was more practical and comparatively less expensive than military interven-
tions that might lead to a quagmire or casualties (Hazleton 2000). Another 
factor that allowed groups to emerge with influence in the US was the per-
meability in the welcoming of groups within its territories (Shain and Barth 
2003). The United States has historically offered economic hope for many 
immigrants, inviting many – both legal and undocumented to come to its 
shores. The United States has arguably been lenient towards the Irish as an 
immigrant group, favoring them for multiple reasons. Ignatiev (2009) has 
suggested that the Irish were able to succeed and integrate into American 
culture and society because of their race. Despite a history of discrimination, 
especially in the nineteenth century, American society came to accept the 
Irish, who by the late twentieth century they had emerged as the wealthi-
est and arguably the most successful ethnic group in the American public. 
Gupta (2017) stresses that the power of a group or social movement is based 
on how the state perceives this group, not on how the groups perceives them-
selves. The Irish were fortunate to have a positive image in American society 
that allowed them access to power and influence. McCourt (1999) contends 
that Irish-Americans considered themselves strong and united, superior to 
other immigrant groups.
We stress the importance of this American diaspora in how Irish officials 
engaged the US government to support their interests. Irish officials realized that 
the Irish-American lobby or diaspora could put pressure on the US government 
to support their objectives. Irish elites, whether they were republicans, nation-
alists, or unionists, sought to mobilize members of the Irish diaspora. When 
the Troubles emerged in the late 1960s, Irish elites attempted to connect with 
Irish-American groups and interested Irish-American elites who could lobby the 
US government to support policies friendly to their cause. For example, Gupta 
(2017) highlights the illicit network that emerged in this period to support the 
Irish Republican Army’s (IRA’s) bombing campaign against the British. This 
network heavily relied on support from Irish-American groups like NORAID 
(Northern Aid Committee) to fund their efforts. NORAID succeeded in at-
tracting support from Irish-Americans who related to the discrimination ex-
perienced by Catholics in Northern Ireland based on their own hardship and 
discrimination in America (Hanley 2004). Gradually, led by John Hume, Irish 
nationalists mobilized more moderate elements within the Irish-American com-
munity to promote a more peaceful intervention by the United States into the 
conflict (Fitzpatrick 2017; Gupta 2017; McLoughlin 2017a).
The networks connecting Irish-Americans with Irish elites highlight how 
TANs play an important role because of their position as mediators between 
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the foreign country and the home country. These networks serve as conduits 
for information, resources, and services (Gupta 2017). In the case of North-
ern Ireland, US government officials achieved a better understanding of the 
Troubles largely thanks to TANs which persuaded them of the importance 
of ending violence and of seeking a diplomatic solution. Transnational Advo-
cacy Networks, thus, proved to have capacity into modifying material condi-
tions through patronage as well as ideational power in their reframing of the 
situation for stakeholders (Gupta 2017). During the Clinton administration, 
the Americans for a New Irish Agenda encouraged the IRA to abandon its 
armed struggle and prove its credibility. The advent of the ceasefire due, in 
part, to the lobbying of Irish-American associations gave TANs even more 
credibility and induced some republicans to give more importance to Irish 
America (Wilson 1997). As previously stated, the importance that a country 
gives to a group determines how much power TANs have in influencing in 
decision-making. As much as the Irish wanted to influence America, they 
realized the importance of having the US government on their side in the 
negotiations. This provided the Clinton administration important influence 
in the shaping of the peace settlement (Guelke 1996). To appreciate fully 
the role of TANs in the peace process, one must understand the historic de-
velopment of the Irish diaspora in the United States and the efforts by Irish 
politicians to utilize this diaspora for Irish political purposes.
2. The Irish Diaspora in the United States
Since the United States is a democracy, domestic groups associate free-
ly and thereby influence the foreign policy of the state. One such means of 
association is organizing based on national origin through diaspora groups. 
Of all the diaspora groups in the US, the Irish are one of the most famous 
and studied because of the large number of people who have emigrated from 
Ireland over the past few centuries and the disparate contributions the Irish 
have made in America. The prominence of the Irish diaspora in the US and 
around the world has led historians to increase their focus and attention on 
both the process of leaving, crossing, and arriving as well as whether how 
this diaspora segregated, integrated or modulated between their new homes 
and Ireland (Fitzgerald and Lambkin 2008). Studies of more recent migra-
tion patterns and experiences, especially those from Northern Ireland, em-
phasize the connectedness of those who migrated in the twentieth century, 
how they impacted on their native lands and how members of the diaspora 
frequently return (Trew 2013). Increasingly, historians compare the Irish in 
America to the Irish diaspora in other parts of the world identifying simi-
larities and differences based on their destination (Kenny 2003). Akenson 
(1996) has stressed that the Irish in America are part of a complex grouping 
who can only be truly understood based on their common connection with 
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other members of the Irish diaspora and on their connection to the home of 
their origin, Ireland. He also contends that the Irish in North America are 
in some ways quite distinct from the overall Irish diaspora that has settled 
in many other parts of the world (Akenson 1996, 218-219).
While most popular accounts of Irish emigration focus on the Famine 
and its effect on large scale migration of Catholics from the 1840s to World 
War I (Akenson 1996, 6), an earlier wave of Protestant migration primarily 
from Northern Ireland came in the eighteenth and early decades on the nine-
teenth century (Miller 1985; Griffin 2001; Miller 2006; Doan 2012; Hofstra 
2012; Bankhurst 2013). This part of the Irish diaspora is less studied because 
it integrated into American society earlier than the later primarily Catholic 
wave of migration. Nevertheless, Delaney (2014) and others emphasize the 
dual traditions of the Irish diaspora in America. Lambkin (2018) argues par-
tition has served to undermine the process of understanding the Irish diaspo-
ra from an All-Ireland perspective and tended to replicate the dual narrative 
of Irish migration. While many of the early Protestant migrants to America 
might have been better understood as Republicans in their lifetimes, increas-
ingly scholars are recognizing the networks that attempt to link unionists 
in Northern Ireland with their Scots-Irish descendants. The attempt to re-
establish a link between unionists in Northern Ireland and their diaspora 
in America has been part of a slow process of redefining unionist identity 
in the wake of the Northern Ireland peace process (Radford 2001; McCall 
2002; Stapleton 2006; White, Wiedenhoft Murphy, and Peden 2016). De-
spite this effort, unionists have been less successful in forging an effective 
diasporic connection with Scots-Irish in America than the continuing link 
between nationalists and Catholic Irish-Americans (Ó Dochartaigh 2009).
Fitzgerald (2008) speaks of transnationalists as people who want to recre-
ate community, a sense of belonging, within the foreign country because they 
were lost in their own nation-state. The Irish in America did just this by form-
ing several groups that spanned different realms of society. The Irish-Ameri-
can population was organized for political advocacy in the Northern Ireland 
Civil Rights Association (NICRA) (Ó Dochartaigh 1995; Wilson 1995), the 
American Congress for Irish Freedom (ACIF) (Wilson 1995), Seanóglaigh na 
hÉireann (which took the place of the old veterans’ association) (Ó Dochar-
taigh 1995), the National Association for Irish Justice (NAIJ) (Ó Dochartaigh 
1995; Wilson 1995), the National Association for Irish Freedom (NAIF) (Ó 
Dochartaigh 1995; Wilson 1995), the Irish National Caucus (INC) (Wilson 
1995; Guelke 2012; Gupta 2017), the Committee for Justice in Northern Ire-
land (CJNI) (Ó Dochartaigh 1995; Wilson 1995), the Irish Action Commit-
tee (IAC) (Ó Dochartaigh 1995; Wilson 1995), Americans for a New Irish 
Agenda (ANIA) (Guelke 1996; Wilson 1997; Guelke 2012), the American 
Committee for Ulster Justice (ACUJ) (Funchion 1983; Wilson 1995) and, 
more recently, in the Friends of Sinn Féin and other groups organized to sup-
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port political parties in Ireland and Northern Ireland. Irish Americans also 
were connected through illicit networks mainly through the IRA with NO-
RAID (Ó Dochartaigh 1995; Guelke 2012; Cooper 2015; Gupta 2017). The 
quantity and diversity of TANs that linked Irish groups with Irish-America 
in the late twentieth century symbolized the fractured nature of Irish Amer-
ica by this era. Nevertheless, the large population of Americans who identi-
fied with Ireland and the increasingly prominent role they played in society 
were prerequisites for the assertion of this diaspora in the politics of the peace 
process (O’Dowd 2000), but the critical intervening factor that facilitated 
the transformation of American foreign policy toward Northern Ireland was 
not just the presence of a diverse and large Irish-American population but a 
group of leaders who emerged in American national government that were 
effective agents in promoting changes in US policy that facilitated peace.
To understand the influence of the Irish (nationalist) community in the 
United States, one has to appreciate how the identity and policy positions of 
this group evolved during the Troubles. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
many in the US came to support the cause of Irish republicans based on the 
media coverage which focused on the violence perpetrated by British forces 
in Northern Ireland. This narrative played into the old axiom that all that 
was necessary for peace in Ireland was to get the Brits out. In this time pe-
riod, the Irish in America who did not support the IRA were called “lapsed 
Irishmen” or “lace curtain Irish” and were seen as a disgrace and betrayal 
to the home country (Wilson 1995). As the Irish in America modified their 
own conceptions of their identity and their beliefs, the way others, includ-
ing policy-makers, came to see these groups also changed (Gupta 2017). The 
Irish in America gained more influence in the US as they became wealthier, 
took up more prominent positions in business and the professions, and be-
came economically and socially successful. For example, Niall O’Dowd was 
a publisher of the Irish Voice, Chuck Feeney and William Flynn were corpo-
rate executives, and Joe Jameson was a labor boss. These represented a new 
generation of Irish American power brokers proving that Irish-Americans 
had emerged in leadership roles in society (Hazleton 2000). Diasporas tend 
to be wealthier than their counterparts at home (Shain and Barth 2003), and 
in the US context this allowed Irish-Americans to support financially fami-
lies, civil society projects, illicit groups like the IRA, and political parties in 
Ireland (Guelke 1996; Almeida 2001).
Beyond becoming a wealthy and successful subgroup of the Ameri-
can population, how and why did members of the Irish-American diaspora 
with sympathies toward Irish nationalism come to have power and influ-
ence? We contend that the critical intervening variable or factor that made 
Irish nationalists successful in mobilizing the US government to play a role 
on its behalf were the political elites who the nationalists came to rely upon 
to modify US policy. Historically, the Irish-American population was espe-
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cially well-organized in cities such as Boston, New York, and Chicago. This 
had allowed the Irish in America to become leaders of urban areas since the 
early twentieth century. However, it was not till the late twentieth century 
when Irish-American politicians from a nationalist background became im-
portant national leaders in Congress and the Senate. The four critical actors 
of immense political influence were Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Senator from 
New York; Hugh Carey, Congressman and then Governor of New York; Ted 
Kennedy, Senator from Massachusetts; and Tip O’Neill, Speaker of the US 
House of Representatives from Massachusetts. These Irish-American poli-
ticians were called the Four Horsemen. Their roles in government enabled 
them to influence the US government’s foreign policy. Interest on their part 
in US Foreign policy motivated them to assert their influence on behalf of 
the Irish cause. As such, they operated as what has been identified as “Con-
gressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs” (Carter, Scott, and Rowling 2004; 
Carter and Scott 2009 and 2010). It was these political elites who effectively 
translated pressure from Irish-American groups to influence US foreign pol-
icy toward Northern Ireland. Tip O’Neill and Ted Kennedy were especial-
ly important as they had developed the skills, knowledge, and influence to 
change US policy toward Northern Ireland to no longer defer to the British 
regarding Northern Ireland but instead pressure for a diplomatic solution to 
the conflict. As such, these foreign policy entrepreneurs were able to achieve 
what Carter and Scott (2009, 27) identify as a “policy correction” based on 
a recognition that the extant US policy toward Northern Ireland was “inef-
fective or inappropriate”.
What made the appeals of the Four Horsemen for the Irish national-
ist cause find receptive responses in the White House? By the late twentieth 
century, Irish-Americans represented a large voting bloc that could be used 
by politicians for their campaigns. President Carter utilized the potential of 
gaining Irish-American votes to justify his positions in the 1976 campaign 
and once he assumed office (Cooper 2015). McLoughlin (2017b) attributes 
to him and his work with the Four Horsemen, the initial spark that began 
the entire peace process. President Clinton catered to the Irish-American 
lobby in his 1992 campaign promising to consider granting a Visa for Gerry 
Adams to gain votes from Irish-Americans in the New York Primary against 
his last remaining rival, Jerry Brown (O’Grady 1996). After assuming office, 
Clinton became heavily involved in the Northern Ireland peace process, and 
some see this as a result of his campaign promise and desire to appeal to the 
large Irish-American Catholic electorate in the US (Hazleton 2000; Lynch 
2003; Dixon 2010; Riley 2016, 229). The fact that American politicians, not 
just the Four Horsemen but also US Presidents, were so strongly connected to 
TANs organized to influence US foreign policy related to Northern Ireland 
demonstrated the effectiveness of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
in lobbying American decisions regarding Northern Ireland (Cochrane 2010). 
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It is also important to recognize that the diplomatic effort to promote peace 
in Northern Ireland fit well within Clinton’s overall foreign policy of engage-
ment and enlargement (Soderberg 2005).
The ability of numerous Irish-American groups, including elected officials, 
to utilize St. Patrick’s Day as an annual reminder of the need for the US not to 
forget Ireland and the peace process continues even in an era when the Trump 
administration has considered ending the role of the US Envoy to Northern 
Ireland. The St. Patrick’s Day tradition became an important part of the peace 
process when President Clinton publicly greeted Gerry Adams in 1995 (Wil-
son 1997). While St. Patrick’s Day is usually seen as a celebration exclusively 
for nationalists, David Trimble, the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, first 
met President Bill Clinton on St. Patrick’s Day in 1998, demonstrating St. 
Patrick’s Day could be used by unionists as well to press their agenda (Dixon 
2010). Unionist leaders had earlier decided to not attend the event in 1995 as 
a means of protesting US policy in Northern Ireland (Hazleton 2000). While 
St. Patrick’s Day was typically seen as an opportunity for Irish nationalists to 
pressure the US government for their cause, under President Bush, the US dis-
invited Gerry Adams to the White House as part of the St. Patrick’s Day cel-
ebration to protest against a bank robbery attributed to the IRA and the lack 
of decommissioning (Clancy 2007). Thus, the celebrations of St. Patrick’s Day 
in the US offer insight into both the specific power of organized networks and 
the more general sympathy the US government has for the Irish nationalist 
cause based on the large number of Irish-American voters.
3. Irish Diplomacy: utilizing the diaspora and effective foreign policy entrepreneurs
Because of the history of Irish immigration to America, Irish politi-
cians have come to see the Irish diaspora in the United States as a resource 
to be utilized to further Ireland’s diplomatic goals. Even before Eamon de 
Valera’s famous trip, the Irish while seeking independence saw important 
allies in the United States (Nyhan Grey 2016). De Valera’s extended visit to 
the United States during the Anglo-Irish War (what Irish nationalists call the 
War for Independence) in 1919 was based on his belief that his tour across 
the US would mobilize the Irish-American diaspora to persuade President 
Wilson to recognize Ireland as an independent state (Ward 1969; Hannigan 
2010; Cosi 2016; Keown 2016). As a Democrat, Wilson was dependent on 
the Irish-American vote in major cities and one could think that he might 
have succumbed to the pressure of this important constituency (Marnane 
2018, 187). In the end, de Valera’s visit was unsuccessful in garnering dip-
lomatic recognition for the Irish state (in the aftermath of World War I, the 
US was just too closely linked with Britain). Despite the failure to gain rec-
ognition, de Valera’s effort highlights the perception among Irish political 
elites that the Irish diaspora in America can be useful in furthering their 
political objectives.
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US-Irish diplomatic relations were cordial after the Irish Free State was 
created with formal diplomatic recognition not coming until 1924 (Whelan 
2006). Continuing close relations between the United States and Britain 
meant that the US would not side against Britain or be used against the Brit-
ish during the Economic War that occurred between Britain and Ireland in 
the 1930s. As World War II approached, the Irish government’s policy of 
neutrality tended to strain Irish-American relations. While Irish policy was 
clearly based on seeking to assert its independence from Britain, many in 
the US would clearly have preferred if the Irish had joined the allied cause 
(Carter 1977; Duggan 1985). The popularity of neutrality in Ireland during 
the Emergency or World War II meant that Irish post-war governments con-
tinued this policy rather than join the US in the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
ganization (NATO). While Irish-American relations remained cordial in the 
1950s and 60s, Ireland’s peripheral role in the Cold War as a neutral country 
meant that the US focused little on her in its diplomacy.
When the Troubles emerged in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s, the 
world took notice including the United States. Though it was very unwilling 
to challenge in any way its closest Cold War ally, the United Kingdom, US 
government officials and members of the Irish-American community became 
increasingly concerned with the violence in Northern Ireland. By the time 
of Jimmy Carter’s presidency, Irish officials became increasingly assertive in 
asking the US government to take a public stance regarding the continuing 
violence in Northern Ireland (Meagher and McLouglin 2016). Irish govern-
ment officials pressured the Reagan administration to have the President use 
his personal influence with Margaret Thatcher to convince the British to sign 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement (McLoughlin 2017a, 82). 
While the Irish-American diaspora provided little pressure during the 
George H.W. Bush administration, things rapidly changed with President 
Clinton. The end of the Cold War meant that the US needed to defer less 
to the British government, and this allowed the US to become a more effec-
tive broker in peace negotiations (Dumbrell 2013). With less international 
constraints, US government policy was increasingly influenced by domestic 
considerations. This allowed domestic Irish-American groups to gain influ-
ence (O’Cleary 1996) and shift American policy from one of deference to 
the British government to one of engagement in a Northern Ireland peace 
process. The Irish government under Albert Reynolds seized the opportunity 
in the early 1990s to pressure President Clinton and the American govern-
ment to become more engaged in the emerging peace process. Specifically, 
the Irish government pressured the US government to give a visa to Gerry 
Adams, hoping this would both legitimate the republicans in Northern Ire-
land and encourage them to commit to a ceasefire and negotiations (Clancy 
2013). This decision gained widespread support among the Irish-American 
community as it appealed both to those in the US who continued to support 
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and identify with the Irish republican cause as well as those who had become 
more moderate and were searching for means of promoting peace in Northern 
Ireland. The US government under President Clinton subsequently continued 
to play an important, if supporting, role by nominating George Mitchell to 
chair the commission that would set the parameters for paramilitary partici-
pation in the negotiations which culminated in the signing of the Good Fri-
day Agreement. The Irish government continued to utilize the United States 
as an effective third party in the process of implementing the Good Friday 
Agreement as well (White and Murphy 2015). Clinton’s endless optimism, 
positive determination, and ability to empathize and relate to the numerous 
and diverse parties in the conflict, not just siding with the nationalists and re-
publicans, made him an important actor in the peace process (Gartner 2008). 
Dixon (2019) portrays the US and Clinton’s role as purposefully exaggerated 
so as to influence republicans to abandon the armed struggle. The choreogra-
phy of the peace process meant that under President George W. Bush, the US 
government played the role of bad cop encouraging the IRA to decommission 
while the British and Irish governments played the role of good cop more gen-
tly supporting IRA decommissioning (Clancy 2013). While President Bush 
was much less involved in the Northern Irish peace process than his predeces-
sor, his envoys, Richard Haass and Mitchell Reiss, were given great autonomy 
to make policy and seek to promote peace and were important if secondary 
players in the process of seeking to implement the Good Friday Agreement.
Throughout the peace process, a complex and evolving relationship ex-
isted between various groups in Northern Ireland and the United States, the 
Irish government, and the US government. Linking the diasporic and dip-
lomatic relationships provide a means of comprehending the complex inter-
action that existed between the different parties to the conflict in Northern 
Ireland and how the US government ultimately intervened when and how it 
did (White 2017). US government action might have been much less will-
ing to engage diplomatically in Northern Ireland had it not been for the 
perceived benefits of placating Irish-American voters and their elected repre-
sentatives. This important constituency in American politics which had de-
veloped important urban bases of support by the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century reached its apex of influence in American national politics 
in the aftermath of the election of President Kennedy. After his election, a 
number of Irish-American politicians reached the highest echelon of pow-
er within the US political system, including the heretofore mentioned Four 
Horsemen. Of special importance to the peace process as it unfolded in the 
1990s was the assassinated President’s brother, Ted Kennedy (Vargo 2019). 
By the 1990s Senator Kennedy had become one of the most accomplished 
legislators of the late twentieth century. The Irish government and Irish na-
tionalists, especially John Hume, became effective in convincing Kennedy 
and other important Irish-American political leaders that the US needed to 
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play a greater diplomatic role in Northern Ireland (McLoughlin 2017a). They 
subsequently lobbied a number of administrations effectively to promote a 
greater US diplomatic role in Northern Ireland, often pressuring their long-
time ally, the British government, in the process.
4. Conclusion
In sum, the Irish diaspora in America, organized in a myriad of TANs, and 
Irish-American political leaders as Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs 
became important actors in making peace in Northern Ireland. In the late twen-
tieth century Irish nationalist politicians sought the US government’s assistance 
in mediating the conflict recognizing that the fundamental differences were be-
tween unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland. Because the British state 
had historically sided with unionists, it could not effectively mediate the conflict. 
From a nationalist and republican perspective, this required the US to challenge 
the British policy toward Northern Ireland by granting a visa to Gerry Adams, 
who the British (and the US previously) had classified as a terrorist. While tense 
diplomatic exchanges ensued between the British and US governments, the 
granting of the Visa worked to mainstream Irish republicans led by Adams and 
foster an IRA ceasefire, laying the groundwork for open, direct negotiations be-
tween Sinn Féin and the British government. Continuing US diplomatic efforts 
assisted the local parties as well as the British and Irish governments in reach-
ing a settlement, the Good Friday Agreement. The US government continued to 
support the Northern Ireland peace process by assisting in the implementation 
of this Agreement. The complex pattern of interaction between Irish nationalist 
politicians, the Irish-American diaspora, critical Irish-American politicians and 
the US government demonstrates that diasporic involvement can work to pro-
mote peace even if it confronts and challenges historic diplomatic relationships.
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